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Abstract 
Article examines the potential impact of macroeconomic parameters on tax 
behavior of governments, which can be regarded as integral part of more common 
problem of state’s economic behavior in tax policy area. 
We aimed to analyze and to reveal the interaction between base and derivative 
macroeconomic parameters, characterizing countries’ economic development and 
level of corporate taxation in order to conclude about effectiveness of state tax policy 
as well as about ways of its improving. 
Subject of study is the possible dependence of tax behavior of government 
institutions from macroeconomic indicators. 
In the framework of given study we used econometric methods. 
We made an analysis of eventual interdependence between value of corporate 
tax burden and certain macroeconomic indicators, representing evaluations of 
national economic systems: power, wealth, investment attractiveness and congenial 
investment climate. 
We revealed that corporate tax rate is used by governments not too actively, 
while the state tax behavior somewhere can be estimated as ineffective. 
Taking into account this fact as well as analysis of reasons causing such 
government behavior can facilitate the optimization of managerial decisions in the 
area of tax regulation. Also obtained results help to reveal instruments and motivation 
of economic agents’ behavior on macro-level. They can serve as base for further 
research concerning principles of behavior in economics in general as well as for 
examining more narrow areas such as “race to the bottom” problem. 
Keywords: economic behavior, corporate tax rate, tax regulation, 
macroeconomic indicators 
  
Introduction 
The proposed article is concerned with the research of the potential impact of 
economic macro indicators on governments’ tax behavior, what is to regulate the 
corporate tax burden and is a component of a more general problem of state 
economic behavior in the field of tax policy. 
In turn, the last problem is a component of the issue of effective taxation in 
general, decision making in accordance with the current economic situation. 
Literature review 
The classification the behavioral economics literature on investment choice 
proposed W. Tapia & H. Yermo (2007). Authors note much of the discussion of the 
topic is devoted to rational individual behavior of investors. On the other side, 
behavioral economists show that the individuals' behavior follow the traditional 
assumptions about rational economic decision-making not often. Specifically in the 
article was singled some behavioral factors, influencing on investment choice. 
More detailed analysis of those factors one can find in Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), who emphasis that the decision making process is not a strictly rational one 
where all relevant information is collected and objectively evaluated. Rather, the 
decision maker takes mental «short cuts». 
Also analysis of impact of individual and psychological factors as well as 
nonfinancial ones on investment decisions is represented in (Anand & Cowton, 
1993), (Agnew, 2006), (Agnew, Pierluigi & Sunden, 2003), (Kent, Hirshleiferc & 
Siew Hong, 2002), (Dittrich, Güth & Maciejovsky, 2005), (Cassar & Friedman, 
2007), (Iyengar & Kamenica, 2010), (de Miguel, Garlappi & Uppal, 2009), (Pflug, 
Pichler & Wozabal, 2012). 
However, in view of the fact that in our case the main actors in decision-
making are governments, i.e. in general non-personalized structures, in the article it is 
used the hypothesis of the rational behavior of agents. 
Regarding of the government behavior on investment markets in national 
economy, particularly to prevent the formation of ineffective states in it, can be single 
out works by Besley (1994) and Tirole (2006, 2012). 
In particular Besley analyzes some causes of market failure and considers 
problems that can lead to market failures (information's asymmetry, adverse 
selection, moral hazard etc.). He insists on the need to consider a complete set of 
fuses for imperfect functioning of the market and concludes that the presence of these 
reasons for market failures is a significant argument in favor of government 
intervention. 
Tirole (2006) introduced asymmetric information between insiders and 
outsiders at the financing stage. Presented models are based on model of adverse 
selection in capital allocation and on model of moral hazard in capital allocation. 
Tirole notices some limitation of their models: absence of asymmetric information, 
absence of informational advantages over issuers for investors etc. 
Government behavior oriented to attracting investment, particularly, by 
reducing of tax burden was studied in OECD Working Papers (OECD, 2007; OECD, 
2008). It considered conditions of decision-making, made the review of empirical 
studies of the effects of taxation on FDI flows. Similar issues were analyzed by James 
and Parys (Parys & James, 2010, James, 2013). Authors researched effects of tax 
incentives on investments and made econometric analyze of influence of investment 
climate on effectiveness of these incentives. 
Different methods and models of interaction of government with investors 
were the subject of research: 
 econometrical methods (Gayle & Martinez, 2008); 
 dynamic stochastic models of general equilibrium (Algozhina, 20129, p.94); 
 the real options approach (Barbosa, Carvalho & Pereira, 2013, p.507) 
etc. 
However, the above-mentioned sources did not investigate the behavior of 
governments, depending on the factors of the economy of power, investment power, 
the wealth of the economy, the favorable investment, so the study of this issue is 
relevant. 
Analysis of the above issues and the discover of regularities will allow to 
forecast the dynamics of tax behavior and provide recommendations for regulation 
the governments' economic behavior. 
As a consequently, the purpose of the proposed research is to analyze and 
identify the general relationships between the basic and derivative macroeconomic 
indicators characterize certain aspects of economic development of states and 
corporate tax burden, as well as formulation on this basis of the conclusions on the 
effectiveness of government tax policy and ways to correct it. 
The subject of research is a tax behaviour of government structurs, more 
specifically, its possible dependence on economic macroindicators. 
Data and the methods of the research 
It is universally recognized the GDP is the most appropriate characteristic of 
the country's economic power. There are several systems for calculating GDP and 
units of its measurement: nominal GDP and GDP based on purchasing power parity, 
measured in $ and in national currency. The research applies an approach where is 
used nominal GDP measured in $. 
To an extent, the power of the economy shows also the value of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). However, this indicator characterizes a narrower segment of the 
national economy. 
An important factor of investment favorableness we calculate as the ratio of 
FDI to GDP. Sometimes there is a definition of “investment favorableness” as a 
volume of FDI. Therefore, for clarity sake, for the ratio of FDI to GDP we will use 
the term “favorableness of investment climate”. 
As opposed to the power of the country's economy, its wealth is determined by 
GDP normalized to the number population, i.e. by the factor GDP per capita (Table 
1). 
In the proposed paper we analyze an eventual dependence of corporate tax rate 
on 4 above factors (Table 1). 
Table 1. Economic macro indicators of the potential influence on the size of 
corporate tax burden 
Indicator Attribute 
Gross domestic product (GDP) the power of the economy 
GDP per capita the wealth of the economy 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) the invest power of the economy 
Ratio of FDI to GDP 
investment favorableness of the economy 
(favorableness of investment climate) 
To verify the possible availability of dependence the statistical basis of the 
world economy for 2002-2016 was used, since the reliable data on corporate taxes in 
the countries of the world until 2002 is not available. Other features of the source 
data are as follows. 
For unification quantitative values were chosen exclusively from World Bank’s 
reporting (World Bank Open Data. Total tax rate (% of commercial profits), 2017, 
World Bank Open Data. GDP (current US$), 2017, World Bank Open Data. Foreign 
direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$), 2017, World Bank Open Data. 
GDP per capita (current US$), 2017). However, World Bank statistics do not contain 
comprehensive data for all countries and for all factors (in particular, there are many 
spaces about the number of tax burden). Therefore a sample of 153 countries is used, 
for which can be calculate the average for all of these factors. At the current stage, 
there is no objective to trace the dynamics of tax rates, so to each factor is calculated 
its 15-year average (see Appendix A, the table A1). 
Since the source data are arrays of statistical economic information, naturally 
for research them to apply econometric methods. Because on this stage the research 
purpose is establishment of a fundamental presence or absence of relationships 
between above factors, no thorough increased econometric analysis was performed 
out. 
Result 
Let's consider graphs of ratio of corporate tax rate and each of the independent 
factors. 
Fig. 1 shows above ratio for GDP. Visually it is quite obvious that the GDP 
weakly responds to the growth of tax burden: the trend line shows a slight increase, 
there are several “surges” among more than 100 countries. I.e. we would state the 
non-meaning mutual correlation (and even at all no correlation) tax burden and GDP. 
Figure 1. Ratio of GDP to CTR 
 
We observe the same situation for the ratio of the corporate tax rate and the 
volume of direct foreign investment (fig. 2). I.e. here also there is no reason to 
consider there is a correlation between the resulting factor and the independent one. 
Figure 2. Ratio of FDI to CTR 
 
It is not about the mutual influence of tax burden and GDP per capita (fig. 3). 
Besides in this case the mutual influence is the least: the graph of GDP per capita the 
largest amplitude of deviations, and the trend line, that in the previous two situations 
showed a minimum increase, here is almost exactly horizontal. 
Thus can be concluding the change in corporate tax burden is not related to the 
basic economic macro indicators: GDP (total and per capita) and FDI. 
In return the identify certain dependencies is possible using complex 
indicators, that are formed from GDP and FDI, namely: a pair (GDP; FDI) and a ratio 
FDI
GDP
. 
Figure 3. Ratio of GDP per capita to CTR 
 
Fig. 4 reflects such process: if for certain country both GDP and FDI are more 
than given limit values (for fig. 4 is specified GDP = $288 b, FDI = $8 mln), the 
corresponding marker is on the highest horizontal line; if GDP is more than a given 
value, but FDI is less – on the 2nd; if vice versa: GDP is less than a given value, but 
FDI is more – on 3nd; if both GDP and FDI are less than given limit values – on the 
lowest line. On the X-axis, there are located corresponding corporate tax rates On the 
graph is clearly showed (and is represented by dashed lines) a certain roll of the graph 
to the right. This means that for economically and investment-powerful countries, 
typical are somewhat higher tax rates than for fragile ones. 
Figure. 4. Ratio of basic indicators (GDP; FDI) to CTR 
 
Fig. 5 shows the graph of the dependence for last factor: the ratio of FDI to 
GDP. 
Figure 5. Ratio of 
FDI
GDP  to CTR 
 
Undoubtedly, the graph is characterized by a rather significant scatter (though 
not as large as in the case of GDP per capita). However, the trend line shows a rather 
obvious negative slope, much steeper than the trend slope of individual graphs for 
GDP and FDI. It indicates also a certain interdependence of corporate tax rate and the 
indicator FDI
GDP
. 
Discussion 
Thus on the basis of the analysis of the potential mutual dependence between 
corporate tax rate and 5 macroeconomic factors can be come to follow conclusions. 
The bases indicators: GDP, FDI, GDP per capita, hence and economic qualities 
of certain country that they personify: the total power of the economy, the invest 
power of the economy, and the wealth of the economy individually almost do not 
influence the government's decision to establish and change the corporate tax burden. 
There are many powerful economies with high corporate taxes and there are also 
many economically fragile countries with a relatively high corporate burden. There 
are also many first and second economies in which relatively small taxes are paid. 
The same can be said about wealthy/poor countries, and about economies with 
favorable/unfavorable investment climate. 
In fact, governments make their decisions based on deeper relations. Previously 
should be noted there are comparatively few economically powerful and investment-
unfavorable countries, and vice versa, economically fragile, but favorable in terms of 
investment ones (fig. 5). Usually, many investments attract economically powerful 
countries, and fragile economies are satisfied with small volumes. The analysis 
disproves the popular thesis that economic and investment attractiveness is achieved 
not least of all by small taxes. Conversely, it was found that in economically and 
investment powerful countries, usually taxes are high than in the fragile ones. This 
can be explained by the fact, on the one hand, small tax burden stimulates 
investments in fragile economies and also supports their firms; on the other hand, 
powerful economic systems act as “cash cows”, which, in opinion their governments, 
can tax heavily. However, the analysis of other complex indicator – the favorable 
investment climate, calculated as the ratio of FDI to GDP, shows governments too 
focuses on the regulatory function of taxes: the relatively high tax burden is more 
typical for economies with an not particularly investment climate and vice versa. 
This, rather, indicates the opposite direction of relationship: low taxes – a favorable 
investment climate. That is, governments of countries with unfavorable investment 
climate do not reduce taxes, but rather, increase them or at least keep them at a fixed 
level. They dare to apply the tax lever only when the economy becomes not only 
economically unfavorable but also fragile by the overall economic evaluation. 
Definitely such approach cannot be characterized as effective economic behavior. 
Conclusions 
Thus, it was made the analysis of the eventual relationship between the size of 
corporate tax pressure and a number of macroeconomic indicators reflecting certain 
estimates of national economic systems: the power of the economy, the wealth of the 
economy, the invest power of the economy and investment favorableness of the 
economy (favorableness of investment climate). It was found governments not very 
active use the corporate tax rate as a regulatory tool. Also sometimes the tax behavior 
of governments can be recognized as ineffective. 
The take into account this fact and an analysis of the reasons leading to such 
government behavior can ease optimizing management decisions in the area of tax 
regulation. In addition, the results of the study help to find out the leverage and 
motive of the behavior of economic agents at the macro level. 
It appears that the results obtained can serve as the basis for further research as 
general economic behavioral principles and decision-making at the macro level, as 
well as more narrow issues such as, for example, the problem of the “race to the 
bottom”. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Average values of the used macroeconomic indicators for 2002-2016 
Country CTR GDP, $b FDI, $b 
GDP per 
capita, $ 
FDI per 
capita, $ 
FDI/G
DP 
Bahamas, The 0,000 8,774 0,465 434,579 4,262 0,053 
Bahrain 0,000 23,545 0,842 3559,569 274,548 0,036 
Bermuda 0,000 5,259 0,102 4014,458 43,841 0,019 
Cayman Islands 0,000 3,207 20,741 3005,210 14,093 6,467 
Vanuatu 0,000 0,595 0,036 12403,120 1506,891 0,060 
Uzbekistan 0,075 36,066 0,545 8835,155 171,675 0,015 
Montenegro 0,090 3,509 0,572 2823,394 149,951 0,163 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
0,100 4,686 0,350 23885,043 623,317 0,075 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
0,100 14,970 0,587 46389,322 1588,820 0,039 
Macedonia, 
FYR 
0,115 8,546 0,345 43946,520 1325,101 0,040 
Cyprus 0,115 21,719 4,589 4452,847 448,735 0,211 
Moldova 0,120 5,192 0,270 24693,844 1325,773 0,052 
Serbia 0,121 36,204 2,451 20380,765 816,725 0,068 
Macao SAR, 
China 
0,122 27,913 2,066 744,365 8,099 0,074 
Oman 0,122 52,372 1,186 15257,935 1040,783 0,023 
Bulgaria 0,122 43,772 3,986 5044,162 147,160 0,091 
Ireland 0,125 232,703 51,259 41154,103 4944,815 0,220 
Mauritius 0,182 9,289 0,264 1240,286 19,986 0,028 
Paraguay 0,135 18,189 0,289 728,175 11,125 0,016 
 
  
Continue of Table A1 
Country CTR GDP, $b FDI, $b 
GDP per 
capita, $ 
FDI per 
capita, $ 
FDI/G
DP 
Afghanistan 0,147 12,869 0,116 81429,544 2059,779 0,009 
Georgia 0,150 10,890 1,027 1950,048 54,105 0,094 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
0,150 367,409 2,986 4066,015 157,646 0,008 
Lebanon 0,150 33,855 2,998 5889,761 237,649 0,089 
Latvia 0,153 24,208 0,915 8208,062 269,244 0,038 
Lithuania 0,153 35,980 0,995 32462,804 844,393 0,028 
Albania 0,155 10,441 0,802 5918,423 531,576 0,077 
Hong Kong 
SAR, China 
0,167 230,275 71,693 527,587 8,406 0,311 
Hungary 0,171 122,498 16,995 212,664 2,037 0,139 
Romania 0,172 148,947 5,426 761,221 72,230 0,036 
Singapore 0,184 209,908 41,179 42210,973 1316,099 0,196 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
0,185 12,630 0,329 64100,908 299070,616 0,026 
Iceland 0,185 15,427 1,326 11021,089 873,166 0,086 
Chile 0,192 187,654 14,912 4352,625 129,365 0,079 
Poland 0,195 416,791 13,740 5256,745 209,887 0,033 
Switzerland 0,197 544,075 22,968 317,817 20,996 0,042 
Cambodia 0,200 11,043 1,063 7617,205 466,641 0,096 
Azerbaijan 0,200 40,766 3,995 1171,079 17,949 0,098 
Madagascar 0,200 7,977 0,539 12035,471 508,155 0,068 
Turkmenistan 0,200 21,966 2,368 27041,830 5486,262 0,108 
Armenia 0,200 8,229 0,437 17063,957 727,312 0,053 
 
  
Continue of Table A1 
Country CTR GDP, $b FDI, $b 
GDP per 
capita, $ 
FDI per 
capita, $ 
FDI/G
DP 
Mauritius 0,182 9,289 0,264 1240,286 19,986 0,028 
Croatia 0,200 52,342 2,223 54040,249 365,585 0,042 
Jordan 0,203 23,569 1,807 1241,492 125,056 0,077 
Slovak Republic 0,204 80,381 3,008 6343,930 370,936 0,037 
Slovenia 0,214 43,272 0,865 4839,746 188,459 0,020 
Belarus 0,216 48,057 1,399 4403,275 44,260 0,029 
Russian 
Federation 
0,216 1340,018 35,109 2264,124 62,038 0,026 
Czech Republic 0,217 177,715 7,543 3394,111 73,286 0,042 
Estonia 0,219 19,283 1,556 14472,971 1161,911 0,081 
Saudi Arabia 0,220 498,066 14,622 350,671 9,738 0,029 
Turkey 0,222 678,691 12,051 3998,566 324,315 0,018 
Qatar 0,225 111,640 2,207 43730,466 1252,085 0,020 
Ukraine 0,228 117,821 5,106 38143,524 723,325 0,043 
Botswana 0,236 11,897 0,472 7858,921 306,608 0,040 
Algeria 0,238 146,142 1,564 479,615 27,341 0,011 
Ecuador 0,238 66,179 0,651 2790,535 262,582 0,010 
Kazakhstan 0,240 127,916 9,277 40050,026 669,346 0,073 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
0,244 194,863 5,201 1104,507 78,361 0,027 
Portugal 0,246 213,313 8,418 23142,996 202,680 0,039 
Finland 0,246 234,048 6,649 7409,957 772,906 0,028 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
0,250 1,165 0,139 2807,072 47,795 0,119 
Bolivia 0,250 19,604 0,541 1781,007 3,584 0,028 
  
Continue of Table A1 
Country CTR GDP, $b FDI, $b 
GDP per 
capita, $ 
FDI per 
capita, $ 
FDI/G
DP 
Cote d'Ivoire 0,250 24,094 0,365 32685,993 10078,266 0,015 
Djibouti 0,250 1,053 0,110 12265,546 1702,149 0,105 
Dominica 0,250 0,454 0,026 49180,099 4299,856 0,058 
Ghana 0,250 27,561 1,995 1120,897 20,661 0,072 
Mongolia 0,250 6,866 0,763 2498,387 44,628 0,111 
Myanmar 0,250 37,422 1,355 4907,414 40,473 0,036 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0,250 20,532 0,501 52347,974 11313,521 0,024 
Denmark 0,254 299,160 2,012 28357,042 1018,279 0,007 
Korea, Rep. 0,255 1068,127 9,557 33470,388 381,859 0,009 
Vietnam 0,255 112,656 6,599 4511,242 228,612 0,059 
Sweden 0,255 465,171 13,945 39074,155 87,486 0,030 
Malaysia 0,256 226,024 7,957 3183,000 260,931 0,035 
United 
Kingdom 
0,259 2585,700 116,796 7741,785 568,360 0,045 
Austria 0,262 368,291 10,827 910,909 11,005 0,029 
Thailand 0,262 296,626 7,880 21538,769 193,771 0,027 
Barbados 0,266 4,252 0,291 37987,871 236,419 0,068 
Fiji 0,267 3,429 0,278 843,783 62,147 0,081 
Dominican 
Republic 
0,267 47,992 1,865 11523,460 430,207 0,039 
Uruguay 0,270 34,779 1,726 7272,382 676,821 0,050 
Netherlands 0,270 771,144 215,386 8542,954 291,350 0,279 
Mauritius 0,182 9,289 0,264 1240,286 19,986 0,028 
Indonesia 0,272 611,002 11,013 11642,917 316,691 0,018 
  
Continue of Table A1 
Country CTR GDP, $b FDI, $b 
GDP per 
capita, $ 
FDI per 
capita, $ 
FDI/G
DP 
Greece 0,273 254,553 2,227 96665,304 36936,873 0,009 
Norway 0,274 387,447 9,389 50502,655 3910,620 0,024 
Burkina Faso 0,275 8,292 0,141 4128,460 166,768 0,017 
Panama 0,275 30,192 2,832 379,005 25,326 0,094 
Swaziland 0,275 3,598 0,054 347,552 14,757 0,015 
Samoa 0,275 0,610 0,013 7999,444 280,894 0,022 
China 0,277 5864,784 173,546 20012,991 21706,843 0,030 
Israel 0,278 216,804 7,769 7447,771 210,648 0,036 
Bangladesh 0,280 114,108 1,255 8753,803 234,516 0,011 
Yemen, Rep. 0,280 26,240 0,153 1455,452 75,702 0,006 
Libya 0,281 50,932 1,364 2455,768 285,376 0,027 
Zimbabwe 0,281 9,877 0,187 5671,740 924,274 0,019 
Syria 0,283 28,516 0,939 2550,366 67,338 0,033 
Aruba 0,284 2,391 0,051 445,241 83,545 0,021 
Luxembourg 0,293 49,340 19,270 735,941 26,431 0,391 
Guatemala 0,296 41,305 0,728 4262,220 259,838 0,018 
Honduras 0,297 425,153 0,844 46508,023 13009,622 0,002 
Peru 0,298 132,277 5,796 32515,190 373,438 0,044 
Papua New 
Guinea 
0,298 13,036 0,033 1528,829 96,141 0,003 
Australia 0,300 1026,722 35,203 1715,132 33,270 0,034 
Mexico 0,300 1017,665 27,238 79314,754 1965,053 0,027 
Nigeria 0,300 281,816 5,206 16334,422 406,492 0,018 
Tunisia 0,300 39,308 1,239 1018,940 13,508 0,032 
Uganda 0,300 16,709 0,662 8174,246 762,095 0,040 
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Benin 0,300 6,687 0,111 1792,941 5,012 0,017 
Burundi 0,300 1,891 0,020 2897,944 45,602 0,011 
El Salvador 0,300 20,908 0,449 4462,376 195,545 0,021 
Ethiopia 0,300 31,920 0,909 1972,673 29,884 0,028 
Gabon 0,300 12,896 0,517 10945,013 360,761 0,040 
Grenada 0,300 0,776 0,081 20337,829 802,572 0,104 
Kenya 0,300 38,453 0,475 64988,656 1711,770 0,012 
Malawi 0,300 5,210 0,235 7312,570 263,048 0,045 
Nicaragua 0,300 8,770 0,557 9252,287 243,088 0,064 
Rwanda 0,300 5,151 0,136 492,515 12,563 0,026 
Senegal 0,300 11,725 0,287 3269,595 70,116 0,024 
Sierra Leone 0,300 2,800 0,265 17971,032 542,855 0,095 
Solomon Islands 0,300 0,718 0,047 909,009 22,048 0,065 
Tanzania 0,300 29,210 1,132 4977,695 336,175 0,039 
New Zealand 0,301 141,335 1,608 431,378 39,349 0,011 
Sri Lanka 0,301 48,664 0,597 41806,176 8130,863 0,012 
Costa Rica 0,304 34,759 2,125 14897,245 558,375 0,061 
Jamaica 0,306 12,650 0,639 21257,911 426,415 0,051 
Morocco 0,306 84,261 2,231 1345,358 88,779 0,026 
Sudan 0,307 54,525 1,580 5828,996 84,651 0,029 
Spain 0,307 1276,423 38,209 28096,554 844,654 0,030 
Canada 0,310 1432,536 44,653 2396,927 29,468 0,031 
Gambia, The 0,310 0,797 0,043 1384,027 40,125 0,054 
Kuwait 0,310 113,433 0,764 6416,559 –49,721 0,007 
Philippines 0,315 186,782 2,862 2992,240 45,557 0,015 
  
Continue of Table A1 
Country CTR GDP, $b FDI, $b 
GDP per 
capita, $ 
FDI per 
capita, $ 
FDI/G
DP 
Colombia 0,315 241,902 9,686 49641,599 1518,030 0,040 
Mozambique 0,320 10,792 2,169 69432,734 2951,047 0,201 
Germany 0,326 3272,907 54,669 1553,833 26,132 0,017 
Italy 0,329 1977,091 22,419 639,130 24,811 0,011 
Cameroon 0,330 24,711 0,398 4413,689 117,775 0,016 
Namibia 0,330 9,398 0,574 15465,085 386,775 0,061 
South Africa 0,333 296,819 4,297 3701,743 117,821 0,014 
France 0,335 2468,629 46,430 9312,410 165,921 0,019 
Belgium 0,340 446,968 53,000 4196,095 450,196 0,119 
Brazil 0,340 1620,913 53,498 482,940 19,491 0,033 
Venezuela, RB 0,340 264,491 2,135 2584,487 111,208 0,008 
Angola 0,340 72,563 0,280 39077,814 1248,104 0,004 
India 0,341 1386,777 25,662 41422,910 1879,584 0,019 
Pakistan 0,343 175,423 2,245 48338,798 855,529 0,013 
Argentina 0,350 367,442 7,090 10265,029 510,186 0,019 
Malta 0,350 8,323 8,868 1230,691 19,106 1,065 
Zambia 0,350 16,690 1,085 2518,152 153,936 0,065 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
0,350 20,985 1,285 9183,228 74,262 0,061 
Suriname 0,351 3,391 –0,022 1280,978 74,954 –0,006 
Japan 0,384 4988,982 11,162 1104,753 7,688 0,002 
United States 0,392 14853,003 264,423 1179,061 76,245 0,018 
United Arab 
Emirates 
0,550 275,172 8,088 684,710 12,603 0,029 
 
